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1 Introduction
Futures markets provide a tool for risk management and aid in price discovery. However
these functions are only optimal in the presence of market efficiency. As is well known,
under the assumptions of rationality and risk neutrality, the futures market is not only
efficient but the price is an unbiased estimator of the corresponding future spot price.
Using cointegration techniques futures market efficiency has been extensively inves-
tigated for a number of commodities and financial assets across a variety of data spans.
On the one hand, there is evidence of efficiency (see, for example: Kellard et al., 1999;
Switzer and El-Khoury, 2007; Kawamoto and Hamori, 2011; Dolatabadi et al., 2016),
whilst on the other there is evidence of inefficiency (see, for example: Chowdhury, 1991;
Mohan and Love, 2004; Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2010). The outstanding question
is therefore how can this contradictory evidence be reconciled?
Applying Occam’s razor, the obvious answer may be that some markets may be effi-
cient, whilst others may not be. This then points towards unique market specific factors
that may contribute to or hinder efficiency. One such factor may be the way in which, if
at all, electronic trading systems are implemented. Many asset and commodity markets
have now either abandoned open outcry for electronic trading platforms, or run both
systems side-by-side. However there is some recent evidence that exchanges see value
in the open outcry method of trading, as evidenced by the recent investment in a new
open outcry trading floor by the London Metal Exchange.1 The evidence for either form
of trading is mixed, with some work suggesting that a well-functioning market benefits
from the open outcry (Martens, 1998), whilst others posit a fully electronic approach
(Tse et al., 2006). However, there is also evidence that when used independently, elec-
tronic trading is not as able as open outcry to impound information into the price when
volatility is high (Aitken et al., 2004).
Existing work that focuses on these two methods of trading often uses intraday data to
examine issues such as liquidity, trader survival, the size of spreads, and price discovery,
across a broad range financial and commodity futures. Examples of such work include
Boyd and Kurov (2012), Aitken et al. (2004), Ates and Wang (2005), Copeland et al.
(2004), Theissen (2002), and Tse and Zabotina (2001). However the main focus of our
study is distinct from this literature, contributing by being the first, to our knowledge,
to address predictive efficiency in futures markets under discrete market trading regimes.
In other words, we utilize daily data on futures contracts to examine under which trading
regime the futures price best predicts the future spot price.
For this experiment we choose the crude palm oil (CPO) futures market due to
its discrete migration from open outcry to electronic trading which obviates the need to
1The new “Ring” opened on 18 February 2016.
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address a scenario where both open outcry and electronic trading operate simultaneously.
In choosing CPO we also address a gap in the literature as this commodity is under-
researched. This is surprising given its wide spread use globally and the increasing
prominence of this commodity on the world food market. Strikingly production levels
are greater than any other edible oil.2
In implementing this experiment we utilise two sub-samples of data pre- and post-
introduction of electronic trading and initially assess long-run and short-run efficiency
using standard cointegration techniques and Kellard et al.’s (1999) relative efficiency
measure. Unlike other efficiency measures which classify whether a market is either
solely efficient or inefficient, this relative measure allows an assessment of the degree to
which efficiency is present. We further contribute by being the first to examine how
well these two methods of trading impound information as a function of the volatility
of the underlying asset, which is achieved by adapting the relative efficiency measure
to a threshold autoregressive environment with a bootstrap confidence interval. Finally,
we examine market efficiency at several points across the term structure permitting a
more comprehensive analysis of the market. It is noteworthy that much of the extant
literature often focuses solely on shorter terms to maturity.
Our findings indicate that the CPO futures market is long-run efficient for the vast
majority of maturities tested across both trading platforms. However, across the whole
sample and open outcry and electronic trading sub-periods there is evidence of short-run
inefficiency. Interestingly, applying the relative efficiency measure of Kellard et al. (1999)
indicates that open outcry is more efficent at shorter maturities and electronic trading
at longer maturities. However, using the new threshold autoregressive relative efficiency
measure, bootstrap results suggest that the open outcry method is superior for shorter
maturities when volatility is high. Conversely there is some evidence that electronic
trading is superior when volatility is high but for longer maturities. Interestingly the
two forms of trading are found to be indistinguishable from one another when volatility is
low. Moreover, we adapt the delay measure used in the stock market efficiency literature
and which, by construction, focuses on short-horizons and provide further support that
open outcry outperforms electronic trading when volatility is high.
The results presented in this paper suggest the existence of an efficiency skew where in
high volatility environments, improved efficiency is skewed more towards open outcry at
short maturities whilst being skewed more towards electronic trading at longer horizons.
This updates and extends the work of Boyd and Kurov (2012) and Martens (1998),
suggesting there is still a role for open outcry in modern futures markets to improve
2Based on the latest production data, palm oil presents almost a third of edible oil market (source:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). See Section 2 for more information on the
CPO market.
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price discovery and related issues of risk management, particularly at shorter maturities.
In the context of the CPO market, this clearly has implications for the price discovery
and optimal hedging of a commodity that is increasingly prominent on the world food
market, and one that also has both developmental and environmental effects.3
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview
of the CPO market, Section 3 examines CPO futures efficiency across the term structure,
Section 4 examines CPO futures efficiency across periods of electronic trading and open
outcry, and a final section concludes.
2 A pre´cis: Crude Palm Oil
CPO currently represents the largest share of the edible oil market, thus the functioning
of this market warrants close attention in the current climate of an expanding world
population and finite resources. It is derived from the fruit of the oil palm tree and is
used for a range of purposes, including cooking oil, baked goods, soaps, washing powder,
and as a bio-fuel. The demand for palm oil has increased in recent years, linked to (i)
the growth of the Indian and Chinese economies (ii) the use of palm oil as a substitute
for trans fatty acids and (iii) the use of palm oil as a bio-fuel. Figure 1 demonstrates the
impressive growth of CPO production over the last 30 years becoming the most produced
edible oil (by tonnes) in 2006.
[Figure 1 about here]
We also compared the production growth 1980-2012 of over 100 crops listed on the Food
and Agriculture Organization’s database, and found that palm oil ranks in 4th place,
contrasting with staple crops commonly traded on futures exchanges such as soybean
(60th), corn (94th), and wheat (124th). Taking each of these commodities as a case in
point, the absolute production levels of corn and wheat is higher than that of the oil
palm fruit. However the production gap between soybean and the oil palm fruit has been
closing over time with 2012’s figures showing higher production for the oil palm fruit.
This study focuses on the Malaysian CPO futures price as it represents the global
reference price and is the single largest market for CPO futures globally.4 Trading tra-
ditionally takes place on the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad where trading volumes
have increased in recent years - Figure 2 shows the average daily volume and open in-
terest (per month) of the most traded (3-month) CPO futures contract from 1995:06 to
3See World Bank and IFC (2011) for a discussion of the developmental and environmental effects.
4See online documentation from the CME Group (www.cmegroup.com) or the Bursa Malaysia
(www.bursamalaysia.com).
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2008:07.5 Figure 3 shows the average (per month) futures price and the 30-day historical
spot price volatility.
[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
Contracts are for 25 metric tons and are settled on the 15th day of the month, and are
available for the current month, the subsequent 5 months, and thereafter alternately
up to 24 months ahead.6 Up until December 2001, futures contracts were traded using
open outcry and subsequently migrated to an electronic trading system on 28 December
2001.7 Global access to the CPO futures market was further improved on 17 September
2009 via a partnership with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).8
3 Futures market efficiency across the term structure
3.1 Market efficiency hypothesis
Long-run market efficiency is linked to the spot and futures markets via the notion of
unbiasedness. Specifically, under the joint assumptions of rational expectations and risk
neutrality, the unbiasedness hypothesis can be expressed as:
Et−τ [st] = ft−τ (1)
where st and ft are the log of the spot and futures prices and E[.] is the expectations
operator, and τ is the interval between opening a position and expiry. Equation (1)
states that the futures price set at time t − τ , for delivery at time t should equal the
time t − τ expectation of the spot rate for time t. By varying τ we gain the ability to
comment on efficiency across the term structure. Under rational expectations, Equation
(1) can be recast as:
st = ft−τ + t (2)
where t is a zero mean, finite variance random variable. Testing this simple relationship
for any point on the term structure is complicated by the time-series properties of both
5Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad was formally the Malaysia Derivatives Exchange (MDEX).
Malaysia is also the leading exporter and second largest producer of CPO.
6The contract specifications have changed little over the span of our sample. Again, see
www.bursamalaysia.com for further details.
7See Appendix A for a plot of daily volume and open interest in the 6 months pre/post-migration.
8The agreement included the distribution of the Bursa Malaysia’s products through the Globex
electronic trading platform.
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the spot and futures price. There is a large body of evidence that points towards both
series being non-stationary (e.g. Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2010). Therefore for
unbiasedness to hold st and ft must be cointegrated:
st = α0 + α1ft−τ + t (3)
where α0 = 0 and α1 = 1, and t is serially uncorrelated. If the restriction that α1 = 1
cannot be rejected, then this points towards a long-run equilibrium relationship between
st and ft. Given empirical support for this relationship a handle on short-run efficiency
can be garnered by rewriting Equation (3) as a quasi-error correction model (Kellard
et al., 1999):
st − st−τ = γ0 + γ1(ft−τ − st−τ ) +
k∑
i=1
δi(st−i − st−τ−i) +
k∑
i=1
ζi(ft−i − ft−τ−i) + t (4)
Estimating Model (4), efficiency is indicated by there being no significant coefficients on
lagged changes in the spot and futures price. In other words, efficiency requires that no
information in addition to the basis is of use in forecasting changes in the spot rate.
To test CPO market efficiency, we adjust the outlined approach. Following the ob-
servations of Goss (2000), who notes that emerging markets can lack proper underlying
wholesale markets which would support price discovery in the corresponding futures
market, and that in the case of CPO that spot and futures market are traded on differ-
ent exchanges in different locations, we follow Beck (1994) and use the futures price at
maturity as the spot price.9 This is achieved using variants of Equations (3) and (4),
accounting for the fact that we use the futures price at delivery in place of the spot rate:
ft = β0 + β1ft−τ + t (5)
ft − ft−τ = θ0 +
k∑
i=1
θi(ft−i − ft−τ−i) + t (6)
Note for long-run efficiency the interpretation for Equation (5) is the same as Equa-
tion (3). As with Equation (4) short-run inefficiency is indicated if Equation (6) yields
statistically significant lags of the dependent variable.
9Malaysia Palm Oil Board manage palm oil physical market and Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad
govern the futures market.
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3.2 Testing CPO efficiency
To utilize the unbiasedness framework in the previous section, we need to construct the
appropriate variables. CPO futures mature each month and therefore a time series of 12
monthly maturity prices can be sampled each year. The log of this data is our ft. To
construct the variable ft−τ note that we follow Kellard et al. (1999) by defining that τ
represents a fraction of the unit of observation. In this manner, ft−τ is the log of the
matched futures price selected by working backwards τ (i.e., a fraction of a month) from
the maturity date t. Of course, it is also possible to express a monthly fraction in days,
and we construct 6 further series where τ is equivalent to 7, 14, 21, 28, 56 and 84 days.
The resulting dataset spans from 15 June 1995 to 15 July 2008 and therefore contains
158 monthly observations.10 For completeness, Table 1 presents summary measures for
each maturity and it can be observed that both the sample mean and standard deviation
tend to increase as τ reduces.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As discussed, the order of integration of the time series needs to be examined as a
precursor to testing for unbiasedness. Table 2 presents the results of tests under the
null of the futures price being both non-stationary (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) and
stationary (KPSS test) for each τ . Given the uniform inability (ability) to reject the null
of the ADF (KPSS) test across all τ we deem the CPO futures prices to be non-stationary.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 presents the results of tests to examine whether ft and ft−τ are cointegrated
using the Johansen method, specifying a vector error correction model of the m-variable
VAR of order k for time-series vector Xt:
∆Xt = η0 + ΠXt−k +
k−1∑
i=1
ηi∆Xt−i + vt (7)
where k is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The procedure tests the
rank (r) of parameter matrix Π, where vt will only be I(0) if there exists a stationary
10The data employed to test unbiasedness are closing futures prices from Reuters (code: FCPO). In
addition to the closing futures price, in later analysis (see Section 4.4.), the daily high and low prices
are used as a proxy for volatility. The choice of sample period permits two sub-samples of equal size
as discussed in Section 4.2. Values of τ are calendar not business days and therefore when constructing
each price series, if the trade date t−τ is not a business day, the preceding business day is taken. Across
all series 93% of observations fall on the exact business day and 99.3% fall within three calendar days
prior.
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linear combination of I(1) variables in Xt−k. Specifically ΠXt−k has to be stationary.
We define Xt = (ft, ft−τ ) and test this using the Johnansen λ-max and trace statistics
to test sequentially under the null of the r = 0 (no cointegration) and r = 1 (cointegra-
tion). Given the presence of a long-run relationship it is then straightforward to test the
restriction β1 = 1 in Equation (5) - this test for unbiasedness is also presented in Table
3.
The results clearly show a rejection of the null of zero rank and thus of no cointe-
gration for all maturities for both test statistics. Further using both tests we are unable
to reject the null that r = 1 at the 5% significance level for all maturities, and is thus
indicative of there being a long-run relationship between ft and ft−τ . This also supports
the findings of the time-series properties of ft and ft−τ from the earlier ADF and KPSS
tests. Testing the restrictions on the cointegrating vector yields conclusive support un-
biasedness as the restriction under the null is unable to be rejected for all maturities
tested. Hence we find that in the long-run the futures price is an unbiased predictor of
the future spot price.
The evidence of long-run efficiency in the CPO market, whilst encouraging, does not
preclude inefficiency in the short-run. Table 4 presents the test of short-run efficiency
using Equation (6). We can see from Table 4 that the longest maturity evidences more
inefficiency than shorter maturities as indicated by the larger number of lags included.
More specifically, as the maturity decreases, the number of significant coefficients is
at least equal or fewer, finally yielding short-run efficiency 7 days before settlement.
Interestingly, when lag 4 is present, it is always significant and therefore suggestive of
some predictability which may be useful to traders.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4 Open outcry or electronic trading?
4.1 Literature
There is a wide body of research comparing open outcry and electronic trading using
intraday data. This research takes the form of examining markets that have made a
transition from the former to the latter, or markets that trade under both systems con-
currently. Martinez et al. (2011) provides a useful summary of the two trading systems for
agricultural commodity futures markets and Cardella et al. (2014) survey the literature
that examines the effects of computerization across a variety of markets. Of particular
interest for this current study is understanding how efficiency may differ following the
advent of electronic trading.
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Aitken et al. (2004) uses intraday data and time-weighted bid-ask spreads to examine
the determinants of spreads on index futures on three major exchanges: London Inter-
national Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), Sydney Futures Exchange,
and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange. Controlling for changes in price volatility and
trading volume they find lower spreads result under electronic trading, adducing evi-
dence that electronic trading can result in higher liquidity and lower transaction costs.
Interestingly they note that spreads from electronic trading are more sensitive to price
volatility and thus the performance of such systems deteriorates during periods of in-
formation arrival. Focusing specifically on how information is impounded in periods of
high and low volatility, Martens (1998) examines futures contracts on German long-term
government bonds traded simultaneously on the LIFFE (open outcry) and Deutsche
Terminborse (electronic trading). Using the Hasbrouck’s (1995) measure of information
share, Martens finds that in low volatility periods it is electronic trading that contributes
more to the price discovery process. Conversely, results suggest that in volatile periods
it is open outcry that makes the larger contribution. However the findings of Martens
(1998) differ from Ates and Wang (2005), who find the opposite relationship between
electronic trading and volatility for the S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100 index futures.11 This
mixed picture is further reinforced by Tse et al. (2006), who look at futures contracts
for foreign exchange (EUR/USD, JPY/USD) and find open outcry trading contributes
least to price discovery (vis-a`-vis electronic trading and online trading.)
Tse and Zabotina (2001) examine trading activities before and after the FTSE 100
index futures contracts moved from open outcry to electronic trading. In common with
the majority of the recent literature they find lower spreads in electronic market vis-a`-
vis open outcry. However, results using Hasbrouck’s (1993) market quality indicate that
open outcry has greater pricing efficiency (as measured by the variance of pricing error).
One possible explanation cited by Tse and Zabotina (2001) for the poor performance of
electronic trading could be that, given an arrival of a high amount of new market-sensitive
information (proxied by price volatility), the pre-programmed algorithms behind the
electronic trading mechanisms may withdraw from trading. By contrast, humans in the
pit may still be willing to trade and therefore impound the new information into the
open-outcry price. This clearly supports the findings of Aitken et al. (2004). In addition
to the slower adjustment to information in the electronic market, Tse and Zabotina
(2001) also find a negative relationship between trades and lagged quote revisions for
electronic trading, but not for open outcry. The authors attribute this last finding to a
11Ates and Wang (2005) attribute this difference in result to market specific factors. Namely that on
the U.S. index futures markets some participants are able to trade both in the pit and electronically.
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different inventory approach between these two methods of trading.12
In related work Ning and Tse (2009) also examine the FTSE 100 index futures con-
tracts pre-/post-migration to electronic trading. Under electronic trading they find that
daily contract order imbalances are autocorrelated for lags of several days, and attribute
this to the characteristics of the limit order book. As the authors comment, the arrival
of a large market order is split against multiple existing quotes on the order book gener-
ating a sequence of transactions on one side of the market. For open outcry there is no
autocorrelation in the order imbalance suggesting persistence is eliminated within the
day. Moreover, a role for open outcry has been documented at the trader level by Boyd
and Kurov (2012), who find that when run side-by-side with electronic trading, traders
are more likely to survive using both systems rather than one alone.
On balance, the extant research tends to favour electronic trading, but there does
seem to be some evidence that there is a role for open outcry in the price discovery
process, particularly during periods of high volatility. However these results may be
market specific and it is of course difficult to draw broader conclusions given the limited
number of markets examined by researchers to date.
4.2 Market efficiency: open outcry or electronic trading?
This study is the first to examine predictive efficiency across trading systems, using an
important and under researched commodity, CPO. Previous work (see, for example: Tse
and Zabotina, 2001; Martens, 1998) typically use short sample periods and Hasbrouck
(1993, 1995) type measures of pricing efficiency. These measures assume semi-strong
market efficiency and decompose the futures price into a random walk and a transitory
component, which thus reflects a pricing error. However for the CPO futures market there
exists sufficient data to test for predictive efficiency post-implementation of electronic
trading, and so we can employ the testing procedures in Section 3 and avoid any such
initial assumptions. The futures market for CPO represents an ideal candidate as it has
made a discrete transfer from open outcry to electronic trading, rather than running
both systems in parallel. This obviates the task of trying to understand the behaviour
of one market in the presence of another, thus making inference more tractable. This
is achieved by forming two datasets, representing the period where CPO was traded via
open outcry (15 June 1995 - 15 December 2001) and the current system of electronic
trading (15 January 2002 - 15 July 2008) and examine market efficiency under these two
trading methods using the methodology previously applied. We view the choice of data-
span as appropriate for three reasons: (i) it yields two equally sized sub-samples avoiding
12The notion here is that pit traders tend to control their inventory levels more easily than electronic
traders. See Tse and Zabotina (2001) for more details.
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any need to address a scenario where one sub-sample may have better statistical power
than another by virtue of its longer span (ii) it avoids the unusual volatility exhibited as
a result of recent financial crises and (iii) it focuses solely the period prior to the strategic
partnership with the CME group in 2009.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for both sub-samples. Interestingly open outcry
tends to exhibit a downward trend in the sample mean as settlement approaches whilst
for electronic trading it is increasing, yet in both samples there typically exists an inverse
relationship between volatility and maturity in accordance with that observed for the
full sample. Table 6 examines the time-series properties of ft−τ and Table 7 the results
of the cointegration analysis. Overall, for both sub-samples, Table 6 is indicative of the
findings for the whole sample, namely the CPO futures price being a non-stationary
process across a range of maturities. The one notable discrepancy between the ADF and
KPSS tests is for the ft−84 (exogenous specification: constant) for the open outcry sub-
sample. Given the contradictory results between these tests we defer to the Johansen
cointegration framework as this implicitly provides an additional test of the time-series
properties of ft and ft−τ in Table 7.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In Table 7 we find evidence of cointegration for the majority of maturities across both
open outcry and electronic trading sub-samples. The two exceptions are ft−28 and ft−56
in the open outcry case, where no cointegration is found. Thus we conclude that the
dominant picture is one of a long-run relationship between the futures price at maturity
t − τ and the contract price at delivery. Additionally the Table indicates that for both
sub-samples the unbiasedness restriction in the cointegrating vector cannot be rejected,
thus where cointegration is found we conclude that the market is long-run efficient under
both open outcry and electronic trading regimes.13
Turning now to short-run efficiency, Table 8 indicates that both the open outcry and
electronic trading sub-samples exhibit evidence of inefficiency to some degree, although
there are three noteworthy instances where support for short-run efficiency is found:
open outcry, 7 days and 14 days; electronic trading, 14 days. In the case of inefficiency,
for open outcry there are 4 (2) significant lag coefficients for τ = 84 (τ = 56). As the
maturity decreases further this drops to 1, then finally zero at the shortest maturities.
13Long-run restrictions are provided for ft−28 and ft−56 for completeness only.
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However these results contrast with the electronic trading sub-sample, where there are
almost twice as many significant coefficients across the term structure. We argue that the
stronger evidence for short-run inefficiency in the electronic trading sub-sample provides,
at the very least, prima facia evidence that this trading mechanism may not always be
superior, and indeed may sometimes be less efficient than open outcry.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
4.3 Relative efficiency
The estimates reported in Table 8 indicate that there exists short-run inefficiency at
various points across the term structure using both open outcry and electronic trading
sub-samples. However this approach is not able to quantify the magnitude of this inef-
ficiency. With this in mind we adopt the measure of relative efficiency of Kellard et al.
(1999). As they note, the ability to quantify the level of (in)efficiency is important to
hedgers (hedging costs rise as markets become more inefficient - Krehbiel and Adkins,
1993) and wider society alike (the link between inefficiency and the social costs attributed
to futures trading - Stein, 1987). For the current application, being able to quantify the
measure of efficiency allows a new direct comparison between open outcry and electronic
trading systems.
The efficiency measure of Kellard et al. (1999) is formed from two forecast error
variances. One is the forecast error variance of Equation (4), representing the extent to
which the model was unable to forecast the realised change in the spot price. The second
is based on the corresponding forecast error should the market be efficient: E[(st−ft−τ ].
Under the assumption of rationality this is proxied by the mean corrected measure of
st − ft−τ . This yields the relative efficiency measure:
φτc =
(n− 2k − 2)−1∑nt=1 ˆ2t
(n− 1)−1∑nt=1[(st − ft−τ )− (st − ft−τ )]2 (8)
We adapt this efficiency measure using Equation (6) place of (4). This requires substi-
tuting st with ft and an attendant adjustment to the degrees of freedom:
φτc =
(n− k − 1)−1∑nt=1 ˆ2t
(n− 1)−1∑nt=1[(ft − ft−τ )− (ft − ft−τ )]2 (9)
where n constitutes the number of dependent variable observations prior to lags being
taken. By construction φτc takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 indicative of complete
inefficiency, 1 for a fully efficient market, with interim values representing the degree
of (in)efficiency. Table 9 presents the results of the test for relative efficiency for both
sub-samples, as well as for the whole sample for comparative purposes.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
For the entire sample, short-run efficiency increases as the settlement date approaches,
while for the two sub-samples the average across the term structure is within two percent
(78% for electronic trading and 76% for open outcry). As maturity reduces there is a
marked increase in φτc for the open outcry sub-sample mirroring the full sample results;
however the pattern from the electronic trading sub-sample is not quite so clear. Further,
our results suggest that open outcry is at least as efficient as electronic trading at shorter
maturities whilst electronic trading performs better at longer maturities.14 Finding that
support for open outcry is garnered at shorter maturities could support the notion that
when volatility is high open outcry is superior in impounding information (Aitken et al.,
2004) - recall from Table 5 that the standard deviation is highest at the 7-day maturity
for both samples. We examine this further in the next section.
4.4 Relative efficiency during periods of high and low volatility
Building on the direct comparison between open outcry and electronic trading systems
from the previous section, we redeploy the relative efficiency measure in a threshold
autoregressive setting permitting a novel comparison between trading systems in times of
high and low volatility. To achieve this the following two regime threshold autoregression
(TAR) framework replaces Equation (6):
ft − ft−τ =

θH,0 +
∑k
i=1 θH,i(ft−i − ft−τ−i) + H,t if σ2t (f) > q(κ)
θL,0 +
∑k
i=1 θL,i(ft−i − ft−τ−i) + L,t if σ2t (f) ≤ q(κ)
(10)
where the subscript H denotes the high volatility regime, L the low volatility regime,
σ2t (f) is the transition variable which is defined as the difference between the daily
future’s high and low price at the pricing date, q(κ) is the threshold for a chosen quantile
κ, and lags are selected up to a maximum of 6 using information criteria adapted for a
TAR setting.
Thereafter it is straightforward to apply the relative efficiency measure in Equation
(9) to the high volatility regime using H,t and L,t for the low regime. We denote these
two new measures as φτc,h and φ
τ
c,l, which are estimated for given values of κ that yield
values for q(κ) that are based on σ2t (f) for the full available sample across open outcry and
electronic trading. For each κ we calculate the difference in the relative efficiency measure
between the electronic (ET) and open outcry (OO) samples, δτc,r = φ
τ,ET
c,r − φτ,OOc,r ,
14For ft−7 and ft−21 open outcry is more efficient while both are short-run efficient at the 14-day
maturity.
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where r denotes either the higher or lower regime from Equation (10). Complementing
this relative efficiency TAR framework we examine the effect of maturity by creating a
short and long maturity measure by averaging δτc,r across 7- and 14-day maturities (δ¯
s
c,r,
short), and 56- and 84-day maturities respectively (δ¯lc,r, long). Further, we extend this
approach by bootstrapping these short and long maturity measures, adding robustness
to our approach.15
We implement our relative efficiency TAR framework for κ = [{0.4, 0.6},{0.3, 0.7}]
to capture times of low and high volatility. As the focus is on high and low volatility
environments, when κ is 0.4 for example, we only examine δ¯sc,L and δ¯
l
c,L (the lower
regime) and when κ is 0.6 we examine δ¯sc,H and δ¯
l
c,H (the upper regime). Lag selection in
our TAR setting is initially chosen using a modified AIC, and we proceed to then remove
the issue of lag selection by imposing a fixed lags of 6. For robustness we also select lags
using the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) and adjusted R2.16
Figures 4 and 5 report these results and the attendant bootstrapped confidence in-
tervals for the AIC and fixed lag estimation respectively. They show the difference in
relative efficiency between electronic trading and open outcry for the high/low volatility
regimes at short/long maturities.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Overall, the results of the bootstrap TAR analysis show novel differences in efficiency
under electronic trading and open outcry, finding these differences to be a function of
the maturity and the volatility of the underlying asset. In particular, note: (i) there
are no significant results when volatility is low; (ii) in the κ = 0.7 cases, we observe a
significant positive value for longer maturities when volatility is high; and (iii) for both
values of κ, 0.6 and 0.7, we observe a significant negative result for shorter maturities
when volatility is high.17
Turning first to the low volatility results, the lack of significance indicates open outcry
and electronic trading are indistinguishable from one another at both short and long
maturities. However, on inspection of the high volatility results differences emerge. In the
15Taking the short maturity measure as a case in point, the inputs into the relative efficiency measure
(E[(ft − ft−τ )] from the high and low volatility environments and the corresponding residuals from
Equation (10) are re-sampled in tandem for 7- and 14-day maturities to generate φτc,h and φ
τ
c,l which
are then averaged to get δ¯sc,r. This is repeated 5000 times to form an empirical distribution from which
a 10% confidence interval is calculated.
16The motivation for the choice information criteria is in part based on the work of Kapetanios (2001)
who examines the small sample properties of a number of information criteria in threshold models. See
Tong (1990) for early work on using a modified AIC in a TAR setting.
17We also calculated confidence intervals for other significance levels. The significant results in Figure
4(b) also hold at the 1% level, and the short maturity result in Figure 5(b) holds at the 5% level.
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case of the significant positive values for our difference in relative efficiency measure, this
suggests that when volatility is particularly high (i.e., when κ=0.7), electronic trading
is more efficient than open outcry at longer maturities. By contrast, our significant
negative values indicate that open outcry is more efficient than electronic trading at
shorter maturities when volatility is generally high (i.e., when κ=0.6 and κ=0.7) .
These figures are striking from a market efficiency perspective insofar they suggest
open outcry can, in some cases, outperform electronic trading. Thus our results support
and extend earlier work such as Tse and Zabotina (2001) and Martens (1998), suggesting
that there are potential advantages to using open outcry in modern futures markets.18
These results also complement those from the original relative efficiency measure in
Table 9 where we found that open outcry seemed to be more efficient at short horizons
and electronic trading more efficient at longer horizons. Specifically, they suggest the
existence of an efficiency skew where in high volatility environments, improved efficiency
is skewed more towards open outcry at short maturities whilst being skewed more towards
electronic trading at longer horizons.
Why might an efficiency skew occur? Tse and Zabotina (2001) suggest that any
poor performance of electronic trading may be related to pre-programmed algorithms
withdrawing from trading during periods of the arrival of large amounts of new, market-
sensitive, information proxied by price volatility. Our new results would suggest an
extension of this idea: namely, that if the withdrawal of electronic traders during periods
of high volatility does occur, it occurs as we move towards maturity. This could be
explained by the time-dependent risks to closing an open contract at an appropriate
price, thus making the algorithms relatively more sensitive to price volatility as maturity
approaches.
As a first step towards checking the robustness of our findings the same procedure
is estimated under the HQIC and Adjusted R2 lag selection schemes and are given in
Appendix B (Figures B1 and B2 respectively). Reassuringly, a similar picture emerges.19
18We thank an anonymous referee for noting that when sub-samples are not contemporaneous, one
needs to be careful about acknowledging the possibility of other causal factors. This we do. However,
given our context (i.e., the imposition of a known structural break representing a complete switch from
open outcry to electronic trading), we think there are plausible reasons to suggest that the pre-eminent
rationale for any differences between efficiency in the two samples is the type of auction. These include
(a) we examine predictive efficiency in 4 different states. Given a change in the regulatory environment
or general market conditions between our two sub-samples, we might expect efficiency all 4 states to be
affected in the same direction. However, only two states are affected (i.e., short-maturity contracts in
high volatility conditions and long-maturity contracts in high volatility conditions) and (b) the finding
that efficiency falls after the structural break (i.e., after the introduction of electronic trading) in the
short-maturity contract and high volatility state is consistent with some prior theory and literature (see
Martens, 1998; Tse and Zabotina, 2001; Aitken et al., 2004; Ning and Tse, 2009) that open outcry may
be better able to impound information into the price during periods of higher volatility than electronic
trading.
19The adjusted R2 approach again provides analogous results to using modified AIC or a fixed lag
length. HQIC, whilst also finding significance for the superiority of open outcry at short horizons and
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The next section also examines the robustness of these results.
4.5 Robustness: informational delay during periods of high and
low volatility
The mainstream approach to tests for market efficiency in futures markets is to adopt
the long-run/short-run framework we applied earlier in this paper, however there are
other tests used in other asset classes (for example see Griffin et al., 2010, who applies
a battery of tests to examine market efficiency in equity markets).20 Drawing from this
literature we apply the delay measure used in Griffin et al. (2010) to the CPO futures
market, adapting it to high and low volatility environments.21
The delay is an R2-based measure that tries to capture the extent to which the
price is slow to incorporate market information. In the stock market literature weekly
data is typically used to estimate a restricted and unrestricted model from which the
delay measure is calculated. The restricted model regresses an individual stock price
return series on the contemporaneous change in news proxied by the market return. The
unrestricted model includes lagged market returns. The delay measure is the calculated
using the R2 (or adjusted R2) from each model as either a simple difference or as a scaled
measure.
The implementation of this measure in equity markets is straightforward. The stock
price presents the price series and market information is represented by the stock index.
For the delay measure to be used to examine informational efficiency in a futures mar-
kets setting we need to generate a continuous nearby futures contract series at weekly
frequency to replace the stock price and define the variables that proxy market infor-
mation to replace the stock market index (in the case of the latter see Ismailescu and
Phillips, 2015, who have made a similar adjustment albeit with different variables to
examine the bond market and credit default swaps). Turning to the continuous futures
price series, we follow the standard approach in the literature by using the nearby fu-
tures contracts to generate a weekly continuous futures contract series with the contract
rollover occurring at the end of each month. As a consequence of measuring the delay
using this continuous price series our our focus is on providing further evidence for our
short horizon findings from the previous section. For our news variables we select: (i) the
weekly change in the average exchange rate between Malaysia and their 5 largest trading
high volatility (in the κ=0.7 case), is the only approach taken that marginally fails to find significance
for the superiority of electronic trading at long horizons and high volatility.
20The difficulty here is that many of these tests are not directly applicable to futures markets which
is further complicated by our need to look at these results in different volatility environments.
21We are not the first to use the delay measure to get an insight into derivative markets. See Ismailescu
and Phillips (2015) who examine if credit default swap initiation is associated with improvements in
sovereign bond price efficiency.
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partners as Malaysia is the leading exporter of CPO worldwide;22 (ii) Soybean oil futures
prices constructed as a continuous nearby series as soybean oil and CPO are considered
“substitute goods” as food processors tend to switch between the two products as prices
fluctuate;23 and (iii) a grain and oilseed futures index to represent the wider market in
which CPO sits.24 Finally we distinguish between high and low volatility environments
using the same measure as previously, σ2t (f), which is calculated alongside the weekly
continuous CPO futures series.
Equations (11) and (12) show the restricted and unrestricted models. The delay
literature usually selects 4 lags in (12) but we elect to include additional lags as well
to see how stable our results are. In Equation (13) we follow Griffin et al. (2010) and
measure delay as the difference in the adjusted R2 (R¯2) between the unrestricted and
restricted models.25
∆fCPO,t = α+ β1∆fxt + β2∆fSO,t + β3∆IndexOG,t + t (11)
∆fCPO,t = α+ β1∆fxt + β2∆fSO,t + β3∆IndexOG,t +
k∑
i=1
φi∆fxt−i+
k∑
i=1
ψi∆fSO,t−i +
k∑
i=1
ωi∆IndexOG,t−i + t
(12)
Delay = R¯2unrestricted − R¯2restricted (13)
where fCPO,t and fSO,t represent the continuous CPO and soybean oil futures contract
series, fxt the averaged exchange rate series, and IndexOG,t the oil and grain index.
Putting the issue of volatility to one side, the delay measure is first calculated based
on the available sample for both open outcry and electronic trading sub-periods. Then
we estimate the delay measure during periods of high and low volatility based on the
observed σ2t (f). In keeping with the previous section an observation will be assessed as
either high or low volatility using the value of σ2t (f) at the pricing date, which in this
case is at time t − 1 and threshold values q(κ) are calculated using the whole sample
22The top 5 exporting and importing partners for Malaysia are: China, Japan, Singapore, Thailand,
and the United States. Source: World Bank.
23See CME (2015) for more information on the relationship between these two commodities.
24The exchange rate data are from Reuters, the soybean oil futures from Chicago Board of Trade, and
the oil and grain index from Thomson Reuters. In the case of the latter the index comprises soybean,
wheat and corn contracts (but not soybean oil). The correlation between the change in the index and
the change in the soybean oil futures price is 53% and 57% for open outcry and electronic trading
sub-samples respectively. Appendix C shows correlation tables.
25Using the scaled measure does not change our results.
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and are not sub-sample specific. We again use quantiles κ = [{0.4, 0.6},{0.3, 0.7}] to
calculate threshold values.
Table 10 shows the results from applying the delay measure to the open outcry and
electronic trading sub-samples. It also shows the results from these sub-samples using
the stated values for κ. We implement the delay measure using 4 to 8 lags and note that
in the majority of cases the results across all panels remain qualitatively the same.26
[Insert Table 10 about here ]
Turning to Panel A, which does not distinguish between different categories of volatility,
the results for all lags indicate more evidence of delay during open outcry than during
electronic trading and suggests the latter is better at incorporating market information.
Panel B shows the delay measure for each sub-sample when volatility is low. The results
match those of the previous panel indicating that there is less (more) delay in electronic
trading (open outcry). However a different picture emerges in the high volatility setting
where we observe that in volatile times, under most lag structures, there is more delay in
electronic trading than in open outcry, and therefore in this case it is open outcry that
is better at incorporating market information.27 Overall, the delay measure supports
our earlier findings, suggesting there is some aspect of open outcry that enables it to
impound information during volatile periods that is not matched by electronic trading.
5 Conclusions
This study presents the first examination of futures market predictive efficiency under
different market trading regimes, as well as providing a timely contribution to an under
researched yet important commodity in the world food market - crude palm oil (CPO).
We operationalize our test of market efficiency between trading regimes by deriving
two sub-samples of data, pre- and post-introduction of electronic trading at the Bursa
Malaysia Derivatives Berhad using a number of different contract maturities. Testing for
long-run efficiency across a selection of maturities using contegration analysis indicates
that the CPO futures market is predominantly long-run efficient across both trading
platforms. However, across both sub-samples there is evidence of short-run inefficiency.
Applying the relative efficiency measure of Kellard et al. (1999) indicates that the level
26Recall the literature tends to use 4 lags, and including lags up to 8 lags seems sufficient as this
represents two months of past information.
27In some cases the delay measure is negative. This is because the adjusted R2 from the unrestricted
model is lower than that from the restricted, thus the inclusion of lags did not help explain the change
in the CPO futures price sufficiently to offset the penalty for the reduction in degrees of freedom. This
we interpret to be an absence of delay. In these cases calculating the delay using the unadjusted R2
does not change the findings.
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of short-run inefficiency is lower for shorter maturities under open outcry and conversely
is lower for electronic trading when maturities are longer.
To examine this issue further we implement a novel bootstrapped version of the
relative efficiency measure, conditioning on a daily measure of futures price volatility,
in a threshold autoregressive environment. The results suggest a type of efficiency skew
that (i) for shorter maturities, the open outcry method is superior when volatility is
high (ii) for longer maturities, electronic trading is superior when volatility is high and
(iii) that they are indistinguishable from each other when volatility is low. These results
help clarify the mixed picture in the extant literature by providing new evidence that
the considered trading systems are complementary and can be usefully run side-by-side.
Although exceptions exists, in particular the London Metal Exchange, a number of
exchanges have closed their open outcry markets over the recent past. Declining volume
is a frequently cited rationale, with more and more trading taking place on electronic
exchanges. Why has this transfer of volume taken place? The extant literature appears
to be relatively clear that, on average, electronic trading increases liquidity and lowers
spreads. Given the immediate cost of trading reduces in this manner, it is perhaps no
surprise that either some futures markets have rejected open outcry or where they co-
exist, the majority of trading takes place on the electronic platform. Moreover, results
in this paper suggest there is some evidence that at longer horizons, electronic trading
is more efficient during periods of heightened volatility.
Given the above, can there really be any role for open outcry in modern futures
markets? The answer is potentially. For example, Boyd and Kurov (2012) note that
traders have a survival advantage in side-by-side systems if they use both open outcry and
electronic trading rather than relying exclusively on just one of these. Our results provide
evidence that open outcry auctions work better, in efficiency terms, than electronic
trading, during higher volatility periods at short maturities. Finally, benchmark pricing
itself might be more transparent when carried out on open outcry venues where trading
can be clearly observed.
However, to support open outcry volumes, the benefits of such trading will need to
exceed the costs of maintaining parallel markets. In part, this will rely on exchanges
running open outcry venues cost-efficiently, whilst making traders and regulators aware
of potential benefits. A particular hurdle is that whilst the lower cost of trading in
electronic markets is obvious to individual traders as soon as they trade, the benefits
of open outcry markets may only become clearer over prolonged periods of trading.
Exchanges that have recently invested heavily in maintaining open outcry functionality
will require that traders adopt a longer-term perspective.
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Appendix A
Figure A1: Daily volume and open interest prior to and proceeding migration from open
outcry to electronic trading
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Notes: The figure plots the daily volume and open interest for the 3-month futures contract 6 months
prior and 6 months after migration from open outcry to electronic trading on 28 December 2001. The
vertical dashed line denotes the switch over from open outcry to electronic trading. Source: Reuters.
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Appendix B
Figure B1 shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency measure where lags are selected
using the HQIC. Figure B2 shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency measure where
lags are selected using the adjusted-R2. The results are qualitatively similar to Figures
4 and 5. In Figure B2(b) the significant result in favour of open outcry also holds using
the 5% level of significance.
Figure B1: TAR relative efficiency measure, HQIC
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Notes: The figure shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency analysis using the HQIC. The figure
shows the difference in relative efficiency between electronic trading and open outcry (δ¯mc,r) as an average
across short (m = s: τ = 7 and 14 days) and long (m = l : τ = 56 and 84 days) maturities and across
high (r = H, κ = 0.6) and low (r = L, κ = 0.4) volatility environments. See equations (9) and (10).
Positive (negative) values denote a higher value for electronic trading (open outcry). The bands denote
10% bootstrapped confidence intervals calculated using 5000 replications.
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Figure B2: TAR relative efficiency measure, R¯2
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Notes: The figure shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency analysis using the adjusted R-squared.
The figure shows the difference in relative efficiency between electronic trading and open outcry (δ¯mc,r)
as an average across short (m = s: τ = 7 and 14 days) and long (m = l : τ = 56 and 84 days) maturities
and across high (r = H, κ = 0.6) and low (r = L, κ = 0.4) volatility environments. See equations (9)
and (10). Positive (negative) values denote a higher value for electronic trading (open outcry). The
bands denote 10% bootstrapped confidence intervals calculated using 5000 replications.
22
Appendix C
Table C1 shows the correlation coefficients of the independent variables used in the delay
regressions.
Table C1: Delay variables, correlation coefficients
Panel A: Correlation coefficients for
delay measure variables, open outcry
∆fxt ∆fso,t ∆IndexOG,t
∆fxt - - -
∆fso,t -0.0248 - -
∆IndexOG,t -0.0585 0.5297 -
Panel B: Correlation coefficients for
delay measure variables, electronic trading.
∆fxt ∆fso,t ∆IndexOG,t
∆fxt - - -
∆fso,t 0.0014 - -
∆IndexOG,t 0.0193 0.5738 -
Notes: ∆fxt is the change in the average exchange rate against Malaysia’s major trading partners,
∆fso,t is the change in the nearby soybean oil futures contract series, and ∆IndexOG,t is the change in
the oil and grain futures index.
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Table 1: CPO summary of statistics, June 1995 - July 2008
ft ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
Mean 7.3102 7.3085 7.3081 7.3084 7.3055 7.2985 7.2917
Standard Deviation 0.3559 0.3501 0.3462 0.3427 0.3438 0.3295 0.3139
Skewness 0.4645 0.4514 0.4729 0.4974 0.4936 0.5048 0.5273
Kurtosis 3.2356 3.1402 3.1955 3.2842 3.2819 3.3515 3.3960
Notes: Observations = 158. ft is the logged futures price at the settlement date. ft−τ is the logged
futures price τ -days before settlement, where τ = 7, 14, 21, 28, 56, 84.
1
Table 2: ADF unit root and KPSS stationarity tests, June 1995 - July 2008
Exogenous specification
Constant Constant and linear trend
Test ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
ft -1.4935 (4) 0.4064* -1.9815 (4) 0.1726**
ft−7 -1.9319 (5) 0.3982* -2.3701 (5) 0.1706**
ft−14 -1.7103 (5) 0.4064* -2.1679 (5) 0.1746**
ft−21 -1.4106 (4) 0.3960* -1.8538 (4) 0.1727**
ft−28 -1.3471 (4) 0.3908* -1.7896 (4) 0.1693**
ft−56 -1.3472 (4) 0.3830* -1.8050 (4) 0.1684**
ft−84 -1.4319 (4) 0.3690* -1.8658 (4) 0.1660**
Notes: The table shows t-statistics for the ADF and KPSS tests. (): number of lags selected by the
AIC. *,**,*** represents a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels
respectively.
2
Table 3: CPO cointegration analysis CPO, June 1995 - July 2008
λ-max Trace P(χ2(β))
H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1 H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1
ft−7 79.8946*** 0.4724 80.3669*** 0.4724 0.7943
ft−14 75.8854*** 0.3623 76.2477*** 0.3623 0.9102
ft−21 90.0689*** 0.2693 90.3382*** 0.2693 0.5014
ft−28 28.0500*** 2.6566 30.7066*** 2.6566 0.5704
ft−56 29.6712*** 3.1608* 32.8321*** 3.1608* 0.8739
ft−84 56.2082*** 3.2621* 59.4703*** 3.2621* 0.9013
Notes: The table shows the results of the Johansen test (λ-max and Trace) with attendant chi-squared
test on the restricted cointegrating vector [1,-1,0]. *, **, ***, represents a rejection of the null hypothesis
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
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Table 4: Short-run CPO efficiency
ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
θ0 0.0017 0.0023 0.0017 0.0029 0.0046 0.0047
(0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0083) (0.0086)
θ1 0.0577 0.1083 0.1044 0.5931 0.8268
(0.0702) (0.0778) (0.0757) (0.1144)*** (0.0863)***
θ2 -0.0525 -0.0659 -0.0704 -0.3994 -0.2812
(0.0853) (0.0937) (0.1040) (0.1494)*** (0.1086)**
θ3 0.0024 0.0525 0.0513 0.2553 -0.0650
(0.0869) (0.1038) (0.0774) (0.1307)* (0.1182)
θ4 0.2796 0.2736 0.3279 0.1620 0.4417
(0.0889)*** (0.0813)*** (0.0891)*** (0.0969)* (0.1527)***
θ5 -0.2148
(0.1178)*
P(F ) NA 0.0066*** 0.0005*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Notes: The table shows the results for the short-run model, Equation (6), with lags selected using AIC.
(): HAC standard errors. *, **, *** represents a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and
1% significance levels respectively. P(F ) denotes the p-value from the joint test of zero restrictions on
lagged coefficients.
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Table 5: Summary of statistics, open outcry and electronic trading
ft ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
Open outcry
Mean 7.1666 7.1689 7.1690 7.1733 7.1711 7.1739 7.1797
Standard deviation 0.3393 0.3391 0.3302 0.3283 0.3322 0.3219 0.3076
Skewness 0.3690 0.4289 0.4078 0.4035 0.4222 0.4232 0.4450
Kurtosis 2.5832 2.5911 2.5624 2.6258 2.6356 2.5975 2.6444
Electronic trading
Mean 7.4538 7.4482 7.4473 7.4434 7.4398 7.4231 7.4036
Standard deviation 0.3131 0.3038 0.3049 0.3028 0.3017 0.2889 0.2798
Skewness 1.1498 1.1410 1.1171 1.1790 1.1965 1.2423 1.1643
Kurtosis 3.2525 3.2215 3.2919 3.3856 3.4575 3.7408 3.9076
Notes: ft is the logged futures price at the settlement date. ft−τ is the logged futures price τ -days
before settlement, where τ = 7, 14, 21, 28, 56, 84. Open outcry sample period: 15 June 1995 - 15
December 2001. Electronic trading sample period: 15 January 2002 - 15 July 2008.
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Table 6: ADF unit root and KPSS stationarity tests, open outcry and electronic trading
Panel A: Open outcry
Exogenous specification
Constant Constant and linear trend
Test ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
ft -1.8829 (4) 0.3689* -2.1086 (4) 0.2079**
ft−7 -1.7223 (4) 0.3655* -1.9681 (4) 0.2117**
ft−14 -1.5474 (4) 0.3792* -2.1222 (5) 0.216**
ft−21 -1.8293 (4) 0.3715* -2.0488 (4) 0.2165***
ft−28 -1.8835 (4) 0.3618* -2.1609 (4) 0.2184***
ft−56 -1.7283 (4) 0.3509* -1.9598 (4) 0.2234***
ft−84 -2.0818 (4) 0.3301 -2.2119 (4) 0.2198***
Panel B: Electronic trading
Exogenous specification
Constant Constant and linear trend
Test ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
ft 0.1455 (2) 0.7286** -0.7159 (2) 0.2265***
ft−7 -0.0735 (2) 0.7312** -0.9308 (2) 0.2242***
ft−14 -0.2385 (0) 0.7375** -1.1591 (0) 0.2189***
ft−21 0.0755 (0) 0.7327** -0.8159 (0) 0.2209***
ft−28 0.2894 (2) 0.7288** -0.5562 (2) 0.2205***
ft−56 0.4742 (0) 0.7461*** -0.5561 (0) 0.2136**
ft−84 -0.3551 (0) 0.7553*** -1.0637 (0) 0.2019**
Notes: The table shows t-statistics for the ADF and KPSS tests. (): number of lags selected by the
AIC. *, **, *** represents a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels
respectively. Open outcry sample period: 15 June 1995 - 15 December 2001. Electronic trading sample
period: 15 January 2002 - 15 July 2008.
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Table 7: CPO cointegration analysis, open outcry and electronic trading
Panel A: Open outcry
λ-max Trace P(χ2(β))
H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1 H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1
ft−7 34.3067*** 1.7865 36.0932*** 1.7865 0.6822
ft−14 29.5163*** 1.5155 31.0318*** 1.5155 0.9839
ft−21 43.0092*** 1.2708 44.2801*** 1.2708 0.5210
ft−28 9.4352 3.1375* 12.5727 3.1375* 0.9623
ft−56 11.5456 4.1884** 15.7340** 4.1884** 0.8485
ft−84 28.2994*** 3.3478* 31.6472*** 3.3478* 0.7139
Panel B: Electronic trading
λ-max Trace P(χ2(β))
H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1 H0: r = 0 H0: r = 1
ft−7 18.1087** 0.0272 18.1358** 0.0272 0.5149
ft−14 50.4781*** 0.1470 50.6252*** 0.1470 0.7266
ft−21 56.6498*** 0.1129 56.7627*** 0.1129 0.2946
ft−28 48.1009*** 0.0450 48.1459*** 0.0450 0.2307
ft−56 29.6180*** 0.0078 29.6257*** 0.0078 0.5319
ft−84 28.2616*** 0.6979 28.9595*** 0.6979 0.1528
Notes: The table shows the results of the Johansen test (λ-max and Trace) with attendant chi-squared
test on the restricted cointegrating vector [1,-1,0]. *, **, ***, represents a rejection of the null hypothesis
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. Open outcry sample period: 15 June 1995 - 15
December 2001. Electronic trading sample period: 15 January 2002 - 15 July 2008.
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Table 8: Short-run CPO efficiency, open outcry and electronic trading
Panel A: Open outcry
ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
θ0 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0038 -0.0018 -0.0030 -0.0082
(0.0046) (0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0147) (0.0132)
θ1 0.1117 0.0685 0.5511 0.8789
(0.1110) (0.1110) (0.1655)*** (0.1146)***
θ2 -0.1131 -0.1016 -0.4134 -0.3262
(0.1099) (0.1256) (0.1953)** (0.1425)**
θ3 0.0559 0.0728 0.2749 -0.0379
(0.1440) (0.1108) (0.1976) (0.1492)
θ4 0.3643 0.4606 0.2183 0.5669
(0.1044)*** (0.0993)*** (0.1419) (0.2304)**
θ5 -0.4276
(0.1922)**
P(F ) NA NA 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Panel B: Electronic trading
ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
θ0 0.0037 0.0065 0.0065 0.0085 0.0174 0.0171
(0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0085)** (0.0101)*
θ1 -0.0333 0.1521 0.1956 0.6489 0.8020
(0.1189) (0.1391) (0.0836)** (0.0913)*** (0.1388)***
θ2 -0.1435 -0.1279 -0.1519 -0.4208 -0.3602
(0.1060) (0.1068) (0.1075) (0.1111)*** (0.1859)*
θ3 0.3909 0.2308 0.1727 0.2335 0.0541
(0.1340)*** (0.1045)** (0.0752)** (0.0888)** (0.1407)
θ4 0.0864 0.0415 0.0963 0.1709
(0.0859) (0.0965) (0.0888) (0.0938)*
θ5 0.2883 0.0668 0.1138
(0.0893)*** (0.0843) (0.1005)
θ6 0.3795 0.2476
(0.0995)*** (0.1238)*
θ7 -0.1373 -0.1199
(0.1140) (0.1312)
θ8 -0.0435 -0.0895
(0.1427) (0.1577)
θ9 -0.1546 -0.1072
(0.1227) (0.0877)
P(F) 0.0000*** NA 0.0015*** 0.0069*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Notes: The table shows the results for the short-run model, Equation (6), with lags selected using
AIC.(): HAC standard errors. *, **, *** represents a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% significance levels respectively. P(F ) denotes the p-value from the joint test of zero restrictions
on lagged coefficients. Open outcry sample period: 15 June 1995 - 15 December 2001. Electronic trading
sample period: 15 January 2002 - 15 July 2008.
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Table 9: Relative efficiency measure
ft−7 ft−14 ft−21 ft−28 ft−56 ft−84
Open outcry 1 1 0.8477 0.7795 0.6156 0.4120
Electronic trading 0.7835 1 0.7403 0.7974 0.6909 0.5411
Whole sample 1 0.9153 0.8994 0.8643 0.6353 0.4648
Notes: The table shows the results of the Kellard et al.’s (1999) short-run efficiency measure. Open
outcry sample period: 15 June 1995 - 15 December 2001. Electronic trading sample period: 15 January
2002 - 15 July 2008.
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Table 10: CPO futures delay
Panel A: Open outcry and electronic trading sub-samples
Lags OO delay ET delay
4 0.0601 0.0128
5 0.0577 0.009
6 0.0602 0.0164
7 0.056 0.0211
8 0.0507 0.0178
Panel B: Low volatility, open outcry and electronic trading sub-samples
κ = 0.3 κ = 0.4
Lags OO delay ET delay OO delay ET delay
4 0.0611 -0.0118 0.0817 -0.0179
5 0.0579 -0.0353 0.0756 -0.03
6 0.062 -0.0523 0.0799 -0.0269
7 0.0707 -0.0352 0.0745 -0.0249
8 0.0523 -0.0542 0.06 -0.0327
Panel C: High volatility, open outcry and electronic trading sub-samples
κ = 0.6 κ = 0.7
Lags OO delay ET delay OO delay ET delay
4 0.047 0 0.0353 0.0922
5 0.0349 0.0043 0.0201 0.0913
6 0.0232 0.0239 0.0041 0.0924
7 0.0107 0.05 -0.0123 0.1222
8 0.0018 0.057 -0.0286 0.1213
Notes: The table shows the results of the delay measure which is calculated using Equations (11)-(13).
Panel A shows the results for the open outcry (OO) and electronic trading (ET) sub-samples. Panels B
and C calculate the delay measure for OO and ET during times of low volatility (quantiles, κ = 0.3, 0.4)
and high volatility (quantiles, κ = 0.6, 0.7) respectively. Lags refers to the number of lags that are
entered into the unrestricted regression.
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Figure 1: Edible Oil Production
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Notes: The graph shows the annual production (’000,000 tonnes) for the most produced edible oils. For
ease of interpretation the remaining edible oils are presented by the shaded area and comprise: Coconut
oil, cottonseed oil, groundnut oil, linseed oil, maize oil, virgin olive oil, palm oil kernel, safflower oil, and
sesame oil. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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Figure 2: Average daily volume and open interest for 3-month CPO futures contracts
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Notes: The graph shows the daily average (per month) volume and open interest for the 3-month futures
contract. The vertical dashed line denotes the switch over from open outcry to electronic trading. Source:
Reuters.
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Figure 3: CPO futures price and 30-day historical spot price volatility
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Notes: The figure shows the average (per month) 3-months CPO futures price and the 30-day historical
spot price volatility (σ30, standard deviation). The vertical dashed line denotes the switch over from
open outcry to electronic trading. Source: Reuters.
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Figure 4: TAR relative efficiency measure, AIC
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Notes: The figure shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency analysis using the AIC. The figure
shows the difference in relative efficiency between electronic trading and open outcry (δ¯mc,r) as an average
across short (m = s: τ = 7 and 14 days) and long (m = l : τ = 56 and 84 days) maturities and across
high (r = H, κ = 0.6) and low (r = L, κ = 0.4) volatility environments. See equations (9) and (10).
Positive (negative) values denote a higher value for electronic trading (open outcry). The bands denote
10% bootstrapped confidence intervals calculated using 5000 replications.
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Figure 5: TAR relative efficiency measure, fixed lags
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Notes: The figure shows the results of the TAR relative efficiency analysis using a fixed lag of 6. The
figure shows the difference in relative efficiency between electronic trading and open outcry (δ¯mc,r) as an
average across short (m = s: τ = 7 and 14 days) and long (m = l : τ = 56 and 84 days) maturities and
across high (r = H, κ = 0.6) and low (r = L, κ = 0.4) volatility environments. See equations (9) and
(10). Positive (negative) values denote a higher value for electronic trading (open outcry). The bands
denote 10% bootstrapped confidence intervals calculated using 5000 replications.
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